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In 1799 Schleiermacher writes a famously scathing review of Kant’s Anthropologie, published in 
the previous year, concluding with a verdict of Kant’s ‘gänzliche[s] Nichtwissen um Kunst und 
besonders um Poesie’.1 In a recent essay Chad Wellmon asks a question that is a useful starting 
point for my concerns here: ‘But what is Poesie for Schleiermacher and what does it have to do 
with anthropology?’2 Wellmon’s answer is that Poesie for Schleiermacher is representative of an 
aesthetic sense that allows a dialectical interplay that is able to reconcile the tensions between 
different aspects that make up humankind’s nature: for instance our moral and ‘natural’ aspects, 
our ‘historical particularity and a universal wholeness’, the finite nature of individual experiences 
and our capacity for the infinite (Wellmon, p. 437). Certainly the idea of a dialectic tallies with 
Schleiermacher’s more transparent criticism of Kant’s anthropology, according to which Kant fails 
to explain the interconnection between our natural (physiological) and moral (pragmatic) aspects: 
‘Der in Kants Denkart gegründete und hier ganz eigentlich aufgestellte Gegensatz zwischen 
physiologischer und pragmatischer Anthropologie, macht nemlich beide unmöglich’ (p. 302). This 
criticism ties in with the widespread conceptualisation of anthropology in writings in the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries as an approach to human activity and capacities that 
treats man as a whole. At this stage I will cite only Ernst Platner, whose name became 
indissociable from the term anthropology in the last decades of the eighteenth century,3 and who 
wrote one of the most widely read books on anthropology of the period, both inside the university 
and beyond it, Anthropologie für Ärzte und Weltweise (1772).4 In that book Platner characterises 
anthropology as the study of the ‘whole person’, and makes this the guiding principle of his book. 
He asserts that ‘[d]er Mensch ist weder Körper, noch Seele allein; er ist die Harmonie von 
beyden’,5 and seeks to explain psychological phenomena in physical terms, and laments the 
separation of mind and body, for instance the neglect of psychological dimension in physiological 
anthropology, and the metaphysician’s abstractions. 
 
This holism to some extent explains Wellmon’s reference to the dialectic, though the two are not 
exactly the same thing. But it is still hard to understand without further explanation why literature 
– Poesie – should be associated with this idea of dialectical interplay, and Wellmon’s essay does 
not really clarify this. What is the nature of the relationship between these ideas of holism on the 
one hand and the dialectical interrelation of parts on the other with literature? In the course of this 
essay I will seek to clarify that connection with reference to an aspect of anthropology’s holism, 
namely what I identify as its antipathy to separation, and to the ideas about methodology that 
accompany this antipathy to separation: that an anthropological approach is descriptive, 
syncretic, fragmentary, and aphoristic. Such qualities are seen as particularly suitable for the 
human, making the novel form as it appears in the late eighteenth century a particularly 
 
1 Friedrich Schleiermacher, ‘Anthropologie von Immanuel Kant, Königsberg 1798’, Athenaeum, II 
(1799), 300–06 (p. 306). 
2 Chad Wellmon, ‘Poesie as anthropology: Schleiermacher, colonial history, and the ethics of 
ethnography’, The German Quarterly, 79 (2006), 423–42 (p. 424). 
3 See Mareta Linden, Untersuchungen zum Anthropologiebegriff des 18. Jahrhunderts, Studien 
zur Philosophie des 18. Jahrhunderts, 1 (Frankfurt/Main: Peter Lang, 1976), p. 42 and p. 53. 
4 See Alexander Košenina, Ernst Platners Anthropologie und Philosophie: Der philosophische 
Arzt und seine Wirkung auf Johann Karl Wezel und Jean Paul (Würzburg: Königshausen und 
Neumann, 1989), pp. 30–34. 
5 Ernst Platner, Anthropologie für Ärzte und Weltweise (Leipzig: in der Dyckischen Buchhandlung, 
1772. Facsimile reprint Hildesheim: Olms, 1998), p. iv. 
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appropriate medium for a ‘Diskurs vom Menschen’.6 But my title refers to anthropology and 
aesthetics. Where does aesthetics fit into this picture? Schleiermacher himself refers to literature, 
Poesie, but Wellmon treats this as synonymous with aesthetics. He is not alone in doing this, and 
in fact there is often little concern among commentators to distinguish literature from aesthetics 
when discussing their overlaps with anthropology. I am also particularly concerned to address the 
overlaps between anthropology and aesthetics distinctly from those of literature because of the 
way in which anthropology and aesthetics may both be seen to grow out of – or, as John 
Zammito puts it, ‘burst loose from’7 – traditional philosophical enquiry in the second half of the 
eighteenth century, and gather pace as an interrogation of the rational-conceptual approach as 
well as the ‘foundationalist’ aspirations of that philosophy from that time until well into the 
twentieth century. Both might also be broadly characterized as trying to articulate an answer to 
the question of what distinguishes humans from other animals, once theological accounts of 
human distinctness have ceased to be convincing. But I will find that the aforementioned 
antipathy to separation also casts useful light on the connection between anthropology and 
aesthetics, which in its Kantian variant is predicated on a separation of freedom and nature. In 
contrast to this I will cite the philosophy of expressivism, drawing out the links between 
expressivism as a philosophical approach and anthropology’s antipathy to separation. 
 
The obvious thinker to start with in a discussion of anthropology and aesthetics in the late 
eighteenth century is Immanuel Kant. We have registered Schleiermacher’s scathing view of his 
anthropology, but Kant does pay lip-service to anthropological holism, inasmuch as he describes 
his own project of anthropology as being characterised by its combination of physiology – what 
nature makes of man – and pragmatics – what man makes of himself. But – and this is the point 
of Schleiermacher’s criticism – his preference is very much for the latter term. Pragmatic here 
does not primarily refer to a practical rather than theoretical orientation, though there is clearly a 
practical intention behind Kant’s book: although large parts of it are fairly abstract statements 
about human cognitive faculties – for instance the interactions between sensibility, imagination 
and understanding – one of its primary stated aims is to foster good habits and character in the 
face of desires and passions. But more centrally, its pragmatic orientation denotes the moral 
dimension of humankind’s nature which underpins such a project, and brings to the fore one of 
Kant’s main aims in writing the book, namely to wrest the increasingly popular discipline of 
anthropology from the ‘naturalists’, which may be understood broadly as what Helmut 
Pfotenhauer calls the ‘physiologically-oriented knowledge of man’.8 The twin terms at play here – 
freedom and nature – are perhaps the crux of Kant’s philosophical project, and will be of central 
significance in what follows. 
 
Alongside the aforementioned holism, this ‘naturalist’ attitude is an enduring topos of 
anthropological thinking, such that Axel Honneth and Hans Joas can write ‘anthropology in the 
German sense is interested primarily in ascertaining the human being’s fundamental biological 
nature through scientific investigation’.9 This biological, physiological, and naturalistic focus is 
evident from the early contributions to the tradition of anthropology in the eighteenth century. 
Zedler’s Grosses vollständiges Universal Lexicon Aller Wissenschaften und Künste, published 
between 1731 and 1750, describes anthropology as part of ‘Physic’: about man’s natural 
attributes and healthy state.10 Platner characterises anthropology as believing in ‘die Wirklichkeit 
der Körper [...], als einen geometrischen Beweis’ (Platner, Anthropologie, p. 103). Johann 
 
6 Wolfgang Riedel, ‘Literarische Anthropologie: Eine Unterscheidung’ in Wahrnehmen und 
Handeln: Perspektiven einer Literaturanthropologie, ed. by Wolfgang Braungart, Klaus Ridder 
and Friedmar Apel (Bielefeld: Aisthesis, 2004), pp. 337–66 (p. 360). 
7 John H. Zammito, Kant, Herder, and the Birth of Anthropology (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2002), p. 221. 
8 Helmut Pfotenhauer, Literarische Anthropologie (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1987), p. 4. 
9 Axel Honneth and Hans Joas, Social Action and Human Nature, trans. by Raymond Meyer 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 1. 
10 Grosses vollständiges Universal Lexicon Aller Wissenschaften und Künste, 64 vols (Leipzig: 
Johann Heinrich Zedler, 1731–50), II (1732), col. 522. 
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Christian Lossius, in his Neues philosophisches allgemeines Real-Lexikon (1803), calls 
anthropology ‘die natürliche Geschichte oder Naturgeschichte des Menschen’.11 Two hundred 
years later Charles Taylor, one of the foremost proponents of the tradition of philosophical 
anthropology in the twentieth century, still associates anthropological thinking with an adherence 
to ‘naturalist epistemology’ or the ‘naturalist temper’.12 This naturalist or sensory focus also 
provides the connection between anthropology and aesthetics in the view of most commentators, 
in view of Alexander Baumgarten’s conceptualisation of the aesthetic as the analysis of sensory 
knowledge, which seeks to do justice to the sensuous dimension of experience. One might draw 
a line from Baumgarten’s notion of sensory knowledge to Helmut Plessner’s interest in the 
cognitive potentials of seeing and hearing, which he thought should replace the discussion of 
beauty as regards the value of art:13 ‘Für Plessner wäre eine so verstandene Anthropologie 
gerade Grundlage der spezifisch modernen Kunsttheorie, der Theorie der avantgardistischen 
Kunst.’14 But I think that the connection between aesthetics and anthropology in the late 
eighteenth century works at more levels than this nexus of the sensory and the cognitive, insofar 
as neither can be simply reduced to a valorisation of the sensory, biological, or physiological 
component of experience and meaning. Of course, any valorisation of the sensory is already 
complicated, inasmuch as the sensory is not just sensory, but rather also among other things 
emphasises elements of experience that cannot be subsumed under concepts. In this vein 
Andreas Käuser reads anthropology’s naturalism as an ‘Antidiskurs zum herrschenden 
Wissenschaftskonzept der Aufklärung’ (p. 198),15 with its preference for knowledge that is 
abstract, conceptual and disembodied. Wolfgang Riedel likewise identifies anthropology’s 
sensory focus as part of a de-idealisation of literature: ‘Dieser Diskurs bewegt sich [...] in 
größtmöglicher Nähe zu Erfahrung und Erleben, Aisthesis und Emotion, und ist von daher 
gekennzeichnet durch eine geradezu spezifische Leibaffinität.’16 But both this final emphasis on 
the body in Riedel’s formulation and Käuser’s analysis of the overlap between aesthetics and 
anthropology are still largely bound to a reading of the sensory or corporeal, for instance in the 
latter’s discussion of the body’s contribution to communication. In my view this focus on the body 
risks perpetuating a dualism which is – and this is my underlying thesis in this essay – precisely 
what some contributions to the anthropological tradition are concerned to overcome. 
 
In the case of aesthetics, it barely needs stating that theories about the aesthetic dimension in the 
late eighteenth century are proposing something more complicated than a valorisation of sensory 
knowledge. Admittedly, Kant initially follows Baumgarten in wanting aesthetics to refer not to 
beauty or art but to the dimension of experience that is characterised by such terms as sensation, 
receptivity, and the mode of how we are affected by objects. But it becomes central to the 
philosophical significance of the aesthetic in Kant’s writings that its non-conceptual nature is 
associated with the other pole of human experience: not sensory receptivity, but human 
spontaneity. Emblematic of this is Kant’s concept of the ‘aesthetic idea’, characterised in the Kritik 
der Urteilskraft, Paragraph 49, as ‘diejenige Vorstellung der Einbildungskraft, die viel zu denken 
veranlaßt, ohne daß ihr doch irgendein bestimmter Gedanke, d. i. Begriff, adequät sein kann’.17 
 
11 Johann Christian Lossius, Neues philosophisches allgemeines Real-Lexikon, 4 vols (Erfurt: 
Rudolphi, 1803), I, 304. 
12 Charles Taylor, The Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity (Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press, 1989), p. 22. 
13 See Helmut Plessner, Die Einheit der Sinne: Grundlinien einer Aesthesiologie des Geistes 
(Bonn: Cohen, 1923). 
14 Andreas Käuser, ‘Anthropologie und Ästhetik im 18. Jahrhundert: Besprechung einiger 
Neuerscheinungen’, Das achtzehnte Jahrhundert, 14 (1990), 196–206 (p. 201). 
15 See also Katherine M. Faull, ‘Introduction’ in Anthropology and the German Enlightenment: 
Perspectives on Humanity, ed. by Faull (Lewisburg: Bucknell University Press, 1995), pp. 11–19 
(p. 13). 
16 Wolfgang Riedel, ‘Literarische Anthropologie: eine Unterscheidung’, in Wahrnehmen und 
Handeln, pp. 337–66 (p. 360). 
17 Immanuel Kant, Kritik der Urteilskraft, Akademieausgabe der Gesammelten Werke, V (Berlin: 
Königlich Preußichen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1913), p. 314. 
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Phenomena that excite the cognitive faculties but which are not reducible to concepts are taken 
by Kant to be a means of accessing the infinite and super-sensory realm of ideas, shorn of any 
particular purpose. Again this may be mapped onto the fundamental antinomy in Kant’s work: 
freedom and nature. Reason and ideas are associated with freedom, whereas understanding is 
associated with nature. Like his anthropology, Kant’s mature aesthetics is primarily concerned 
with accommodating an idea of human freedom within a world of determinate nature. This 
articulation of freedom and nature is expressed in several ideas: beauty, even if it appears in the 
seemingly purposeless mechanism (nature), is associated with something purposive, usually 
seen as a quality of free human reason. Or, similarly, beautiful objects are seen to be ones in 
which infinite ideas are given finite, sensuous form.18 Likewise the aesthetic experience is taken 
by Kant to indicate something universal and disinterested, even if it is always at some level 
subjective and determinate. 
 
These are broad brush strokes, but the point for my concerns is that Kant’s analysis of the 
aesthetic is predicated on the separation of nature (in its manifestations as understanding or 
empirical experience) and freedom (in its manifestations as reason, logic or the free play of 
imagination), even if the aesthetic is seen to be an experience in which they are combined. In this 
analysis, the aesthetic experience is seen to reconnect various seemingly separate elements of 
experience. It explains our connection to the world, grounded in subjectivity but partaking of 
universal value. It explains the connection between different elements of ourselves, such as the 
understanding and imagination, which Kant sees as deriving from nature and freedom 
respectively, and which are seen to achieve harmony in the pleasure of the experience of beauty 
(see Paragraph 9 of the Kritik der Urteilskraft). Here my main concern is to underline the dualism 
at the heart of Kantian aesthetics, which is the same one that Schleiermacher discerns in his 
anthropology: the separation between a world of nature and a world of freedom. One might even 
speculate that Kantian and post-Kantian aesthetics remains beholden to dualism because it is 
precisely conceived as the means to reunite two spheres. The point where this connecting role 
becomes a specific project is in Schiller’s aesthetics, in which aesthetic experience can unify or 
rebalance our sensuous and rational faculties, as expressed in Letter XXI of the Ästhetische 
Briefe. He refers to mankind’s capacity to achieve this balance the ‘Schenkung der Menschheit’.19 
Schiller’s debt to Kant is apparent when he sees this harmony of our sensuous and rational 
faculties as generating a freedom that he calls ‘aesthetic’. (‘Über die ästhetische Erziehung’, p. 
377) Schiller’s writings are also the point at which the overlap between aesthetics and 
anthropology becomes apparent: his work has been described as ‘programme of anthropological 
aesthetics’.20 But it is worth noting that there is a tension between such a project, in which unity is 
something to be achieved, for instance in the aesthetic experience, and the anti-dualist attitude of 
Schiller’s early, more ‘anthropological’ essays, in which the premise is that humankind is already 
an ‘innigste Vermischung’ of body and soul: ‘Diß ist die wunderbare und merkwürdige Sympathie, 
die die heterogenen Principien des Menschen gleichsam zu Einem Wesen macht, der Mensch ist 
nicht Seele und Körper, der Mensch ist die innigste Vermischung dieser beiden Substanzen.’21 
 
I call these early essays ‘anthropological’ because much late eighteenth century anthropology 
does not see holism as project of reunifying the faculties, but is pointedly anti-dualist in its 
concern to avoid this kind of hard-and-fast conceptual separation in the first place. I have already 
cited Platner’s anthropological conceptualisation of humankind as a ‘harmony’ of mind and body. 
Likewise Heinrich Weber in Anthropologische Versuche (1810) defines ‘true anthropology’ as the 
‘Wissenschaft des ganzen concreten Menschen, äussere und innere Menschenlehre 
 
18 See Andrew Bowie, Aesthetics and Subjectivity: From Kant to Nietzsche, 2nd edn (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2003), p. 43. 
19 Friedrich Schiller, ‘Über die ästhetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen’, 
NA, 20, pp. 309–412 (p. 378). 
20 Walter Hinderer and Daniel Dahlstrom, ‘Introduction’, Friedrich Schiller, Essays, ed. by 
Hinderer and Dahlstrom (London: Continuum, 1993), pp. vii–xxv (p. viii). 
21 Friedrich Schiller, ‘Versuch über den Zusammenhang der thierischen Natur des Menschen mit 
seiner geistigen’, NA, 20, pp. 37–75 (p. 64). 
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zusammen’.22 One can discern a range of positions in the anthropological texts, from those that 
retain dualist categories, to those that go further in rejecting their validity. Even the former, 
though, insist on the many influences of mind on body and vice versa. Carl Schmid in his 
Empirische Psychologie (1791) sees mind and body ‘in wechselseitigem Verhältnisse zu 
einander’,23 and sees his task as investigating the reciprocal relationship between man’s internal 
aspects (‘Empfinden, Denken und Begehren’) and external aspects (‘seine Körper, die mit ihm 
zunächst verbundene Materie, oder die fortdauernden Erscheinungen seines äusern Sinnes’) 
(Empirische Psychologie, p. 11). Karl Pölitz characterises anthropology in Populäre 
Anthropologie, oder Kunde von dem Menschen nach seinen sinnlichen und geistigen Anlagen 
(1800) as a ‘Lehre von den äussern und innern bleibenden Erscheinungen an dem Menschen’, 
albeit describing it in this regard as an ‘isolated science’.24 Victorin Laaber in Grundzüge der 
neuern Philosophie (1801) describes anthropology as the analysis of inner, mental and outer, 
physical aspects of experience, and in particular of their mutual ‘Wechselwirkung’.25 Johann 
Wezel in System der empirischen Anthropologie (1803) characterises anthropology as the 
‘Wissenschaft von der doppelten Natur des Menschen in ihrem Zusammenhange, gegenseitigeen 
Verhältnisse und Einflusse’.26 The point that I want to draw out of the above statements is that the 
stated aim is not to explain the interconnection between mental and corporeal experience, nor to 
achieve harmony between the two. Rather because things are interconnected in experience, the 
challenge is for knowledge to trace and describe the manifold interrelations between disparate 
elements. Several of the contributors to the discourse on anthropology in the late eighteenth 
century state explicitly that they are not interested in explaining the interconnection between body 
and mind, rather they precisely take man’s unity as a starting premise, as the sine qua non of 
meaningful experience. Platner insists that the question of how the connection between soul and 
world is possible is irrelevant to him (see Platner, Anthropologie, pp. xi-xii). Johann Feder, albeit 
not wanting to give up on dualist categories, sees the connection between mind and body as 
being a matter of everyday experience.27 Wilhelm Liebsch in Grundriß der Anthropologie 
physiologisch und nach einem neuen Plane bearbeitet (1808) criticizes some contributions to 
anthropology for being premised on the idea that mind and body are separate, which he adjudges 
to be an ‘unverweisliche und irrige Voraussetzung’.28 
 
These anti-dualist reflections do not happen in a vacuum, of course. The context for these 
writings may be speculatively reconstructed from theories associated with vitalism and to a lesser 
extent mechanism and animism, which in the course of the eighteenth century gradually introduce 
decidedly holist elements in thinking about humankind’s make-up. At the start of the century 
Georg Ernst Stahl, ostensibly an animist, revalorises physiological elements, insofar as he 
suggests that the body has ‘intelligences’, evident for instance in the way it moves the blood flow 
to where it is needed (Stahl, De Motu Tonico Vitali, 1692). This insight leads to his view of 
pathology and physiology, dealt with in Theoria Medica Vera (1708), based on the ‘organic body’, 
preparing the way for an approach that takes man as an integrated whole.29 Albrecht von Haller’s 
 
22 Heinrich Benedict von Weber, Anthropologische Versuche zur Beförderung einer gründlichen 
und umfassenden Menschenkunde für Wissenschaft und Leben (Heidelberg: Mohr und Zimmer, 
1810), p. 7. 
23 Carl Christian Erhard Schmid, Empirische Psychologie (Jena: Cröker, 1791), p. 11. 
24 Karl Heinrich Ludwig Pölitz, Popluläre Anthropologie, oder Kunde von dem Menschen nach 
seinen sinnlichen und geistigen Anlagen (Leipzig: Kramer, 1800), p. 6 and p. 16. 
25 Victorin Laaber, Grundzüge der neuern Philosophie, 2 vols (Wien: Doll, 1801) II, p. 381. 
26 Johann Karl Wezel, System der empirischen Anthropologie, oder der ganzen 
Erfahrungsmenschenlehre, 2 vols (Leipzig: Dyksch, 1803), I, p. 13. 
27 See Linden, p. 42. 
28 Wilhelm Liebsch, Grundriß der Anthropologie physiologisch und nach einem neuen Plane 
bearbeitet, 2 vols (Göttingen: Vandenhoek und Ruprecht, 1806–08), II, p. xxiii. 
29 See Johanna Geyer-Kordesch, ‘Georg Ernst Stahl’s radical Pietist medicine and its influence 
on the German Enlightenment’ in The medical enlightenment of the eighteenth century, ed. by 
Andrew Cunningham and Roger French (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 67–
87 (p. 69, p. 75). 
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identification in 1756 of irritability as a property of muscle fibres has also been seen as a theory of 
‘innate bodily faculties’ that discredits strictly mechanist and animist models.30 In mid-century 
there are a number of other contributions that start to identify more specific interconnections 
between mind and body. David Hartley’s Observations on Man, his Frame, his Duty (1749) is the 
first book on psychology that links mind and physiology via the nervous system. Johann Gottllob 
Krüger, as part of his Naturlehre (1740-50), under the section on pathology, discusses the 
connection between nerves and mind in terms of analogy.31 Johann Georg Sulzer investigates 
the physiological basis for imagination in Untersuchung über den Ursprung der angenehmen und 
unangenehmen Empfindungen (1751/2), and fixations or memories are seen to be the basis of 
experiences that are as present and intense as physical sensations, with the conclusion that in 
some experiences sensory and mental capacities are indistinguishable (see Dürbeck, 
Einbildungskraft und Aufklärung, p. 135, pp. 153-155). Ernst Platner himself investigates the 
physiological dimension of attention, memory and imagination (see Platner, Anthropologie, pp. 
103-170), aspects of his work that go some way to refuting Pfotenhauer’s verdict that it ends up in 
a physiological dead-end, and Käuser’s view that anthropology’s sensory focus suffers from a 
‘mangelnde Dialektik’ and ‘syntheselose Antinomie’ (‘Anthropologie und Ästhetik im 18. 
Jahrhundert’, p. 204.). 
 
The antipathy to separation that is my central theoretical idea here is also evident in the 
methodological orientation that is associated with anthropology, which Sergio Moravia 
characterizes as a process of ‘epistemological liberalisation’.32 Key methodological tenets here 
which link directly to anthropology’s naturalism are empirical observation, description, and the 
physiological basis of writings on anthropology – all in keeping with the new positivism and 
objectivism that characterised modern science since the seventeenth century. But it is also 
important to note that the methodology that is the stated preference of some of those associated 
with anthropology is hybrid, syncretic, and interdisciplinary. Tessitore calls it an ‘Ausdehnung des 
Erkenntnisbereichs über die Gesetze des diskursiven Denkens hinaus’.33 This extension can 
mean a reference to multiple sources, and a variety of texts, such as religious texts or literary 
works, as well as science and philosophy,34 what Pfotenhauer refers to as a ‘Mischformen der 
Argumentation’ (Literarische Anthropologie, p. 4). Gottfried Wenzel in Menschenlehre oder 
System einer Anthropologie nach den neuesten Beobachtungen, Versuchen und Grundsätzen 
der Physik und Philosophie (1802) describes the demands on the anthropologist made by such 
methodology: ‘Philosoph, Physiker, Anatom und Physiolog muß der Mann sein, der in dem 
grossen Gebiethe der Anthropologie Fortschritte Machen will’.35 The association of anthropology 
with aphoristic method is also important here. In the Vorrede to his Anthropologie Platner 
describes the advantage of aphorism in terms which might be taken as consciously anti-
systematic: ‘Die aphoristische Schreibart hat den Vorzug der möglichsten Kürze, und dieses ohne 
Nachtheil der Vollständigkeit.’ (p. xix) The key quality of aphorism here seems to be that it 
eschews any fundamental, philosophical explanation of the relationship between parts. In this 
vein Pfotenhauer makes the link between aphorism and anthropology’s antipathy to separation: 
‘Allein der aphoristische Stil darf Sachverhalte witzig-experimentierend und ohne systematische 
Trennungen und Hierarchisierungen fassen’ (Literarische Anthropologie, p. 6). Käuser likewise 
 
30 See Hubert Steinke, Irritating Experiments: Haller’s Concept and the European Controversy on 
Irritability and Sensibility, 1750–90, Wellcome Series in the History of Medicine, 76 (Amsterdam: 
Rodopi, 2005), p. 10. 
31 See Gabriele Dürbeck, Einbildungskraft und Aufklärung. Perspektiven der Philosophie, 
Anthropologie und Ästhetik um 1750 (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1998), p. 123. 
32 Sergio Moravia, ‘The Enlightenment and the Sciences of Man’, History of Science, 18 (1980), 
247–68 (p. 247). 
33 Fulvio Tessitore, Kritischer Historismus: Gesammelte Aufsätze, Collegium Hermeneuticum: 
Deutsch-italienische Studien zur Kulturwissenschaft und Philosophie, 11 (Köln: Böhlau, 2005), p. 
25. 
34 Christian Thies, Einführung in die philosophische Anthropologie, 2nd edn (Darmstadt: WBG, 
2009), p. 13. 
35 Cited in Linden, p. 125. 
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insists: ‘Nicht also ein kohärentes System, eine in sich schlüssige und logische Darstellungsweise 
ist somit kennzeichnend für eine anthropologische Ästhetik, sondern eine fragmentarische 
Diskursform’ (‘Anthropologie und Ästhetik’, p. 205). 
 
The methodological turn is also the point at which to bring literature back into the picture, before 
returning to the question of the connection with aesthetics. To Wellmon’s fairly unspecific notion 
of dialectical dynamism as the quality that underlies the association between literature and 
anthropology I propose to add the qualities of antipathy to separation and methodological 
hybridity. Crucial here is the growing status of narrative prose, and in particular the previously 
low-status fictional novel, during the second half of the eighteenth century, which is seen as the 
point at which – before the advent of the human and social sciences – discussion of man and his 
psychology first takes centre-stage. In this vein Wolfgang Riedel describes literature as ‘Medium 
des Menschenstudiums’, the best medium for showing ‘das Innre des Menschen’.36 He shows 
how this phenomenon is evident in the novels that study human and moral development (e.g. 
those of Wieland), but also those diaries that make a point of self-observation (e.g. those of 
Lichtenberg), and even those pointedly psychological stories with a moral intention (e.g. Schiller’s 
moral case studies). Moral material and lessons clearly abound here, but Riedel discerns a shift 
from moral interest to psychological interest in the character, and specifically the origin or 
development of the mind (see ‘Anthropologie und Literatur’, pp. 133-4). One of the places this 
multi-faceted approach to literature gets most clearly theorised is in Christian Friedrich von 
Blanckenburg’s Versuch über den Roman (1774), in which he makes a claim for the 
appropriateness of the novel form for the age, analogous to the Greeks’ epic poem.37 In the main 
body of the essay he implores contemporary novelists to attend to the simultaneous presentation 
of mind, body, and environment in their main characters: 
 
Der Dichter wird in der Zusammensetzung seines Charakters, Rücksicht auf seine Zeit, 
seine Erziehung, sein Alter, sein Land, seine Religion, seinen Stand im bürgerlichen 
Leben, auf die Eigenschaften selbst, die er ihm gibt: mit einem Worte, auf seine ganze 
Verfassung Rücksicht nehmen müssen [...]. Er wird so gar auf körperliche Umstände, auf 
Temperament und andere Dinge mehr sehen, und den Einfluß derselben nie aus dem 
Auge lassen. (Versuch, p. 65) 
 
The focus on human development and biography in these examples is a crucial instance of the 
process by which anthropology absolves itself of the need to follow strict philosophical method 
and to observe categorical separations, insofar as it marks the point at which knowledge of the 
human starts to become less abstract and more concrete and contextual, less systematic and 
more individual and personal. Helmut Pfotenhauer explores the methodological implications of 
anthropology’s literary manifestation in autobiography, referring to ‘die Lebensbeschreibung – 
und genauer: die eigenen Lebensbeschreibungen, die Ausbreitungen des Individuell-Eigenartigen 
am Ich’ (Literarische Anthropologie, p. 14). I will come back to this issue of ‘Ausbreitungen’ later, 
but an obvious contrast here with philosophy that has universal ambitions is that personal self-
reference is permitted: Pfotenhauer refers in this regard to the ‘Neigung zum literarischen 
Selbstbezug im Sachbezug’ (p. 6). We can trace this attitude back to Johann Gottfried Herder, in 
whose most anthropological essay, ‘Vom Erkennen und Empfinden in der menschlichen Seele’ 
(1778), we find the assertion that the ‘tiefste Grund unsres Daseins ist individuell, so wohl in 
Empfindungen als Gedanken’.38 In keeping with this, Herder thinks that the life story, and 
autobiography in particular, is the most authentic way to write the ‘Seelenlehre’, displacing the 
 
36 Wolfgang Riedel, ‘Anthropologie und Literatur in der deutschen Spätaufklärung. Skizze einer 
Forschungslandschaft’, Internationales Archiv für Sozialgeschichte der deutschen Literatur, 
Sonderheft 6 (1994), 93–157 (pp. 111, 133). 
37 Christian Friedrich von Blanckenburg, ‘Vorbericht’, in Blanckenburg, Versuch über den Roman 
(Leipzig: Siegerts, 1774. Facsimile reprint Stuttgart: Metzler, 1965), pp. 11–12. 
38 Johann Gottfried Herder, ‘Vom Erkennen und Empfinden in der menschlichen Seele’, Herders 
Sämmtliche Werke, ed. by Bernhard Suphan, 33 vols (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 
1877-1913), VIII (1892), pp. 165–235 (p. 207). 
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tendency to reduce experience to universalizable concepts (‘Vom Erkennen und Empfinden’, p. 
180.) Arnold Gehlen, a thinker who contributes to the discourse on philosophical anthropology in 
the early twentieth century, is making the same point two hundred years later when, in Der 
Mensch: Seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt, he suggests that one can approach reality 
either in terms of ‘Begriffsschemata’, such as drive theory, or one can accept that human 
responses to experiences are so variable, notwithstanding the array of instinctual drives that we 
are subject to, that there is a point beyond which we can only understand a person’s reality in 
terms of individualised description: ‘Entweder erhält man für “den Menschen” eine beliebig lange 
Liste inhaltlich ausgeleerter Begriffe, oder, wenn man konkretisieren will, fällt man notwendig ins 
Beschreibend-Biographische zurück.’39 
 
This preference for ‘concrete’ description of a life over universal, abstract concepts is 
characteristic of anthropology. We have already encountered a variant of it in Heinrich Weber’s 
characterisation of anthropology, cited at the outset, as dealing with the ‘ganzer, concreter 
Mensch’. This concrete quality is contrasted with an approach that is excessively theoretical, as is 
encapsulated in Hans-Jürgen Schings’ remark that the eighteenth-century ‘anthropologisch-
psychologischer Roman’ is anti-theoretical, marking (in the case of Wieland’s Don Silvio) the 
‘Sieg der Natur und der natürlichen Erklärung, also auch der Anthropologie, über die 
Schwärmerei, das Wunderbare, also auch über die Metaphysik’.40 It seems reasonable to 
interpret Schings’ reference to metaphysics here in terms of the antipathy to separation that is the 
central theme of this essay, where metaphysics denotes precisely the kind of methodology that 
separates reason and logic from need and volition. It is important to register that the enemy here 
is not philosophy per se, which after all in the eighteenth century was also often used as a term 
for the kind of investigation of cognitive processes that we now label psychology, but rather 
philosophy that proceeds by means of conceptual and categorical separation and abstraction. 
Certainly anthropological writings contain repeated verdicts on such approaches to philosophy. 
Karl Pölitz, for instance, characterizes anthropology in contrast to ‘historische, zur Wissenschaft 
erhobene, Darstellungen der verschiednen philosophischen Meinungen über das Verhältniss der 
Dinge an sich zu den Erscheinungen’ (Pölitz, Populäre Anthropologie, pp. 14-15). Jutta Heinz 
discerns a gradual ‘Emanzipation der Anthropologie von der Philosophie’. Johann Karl Wezel’s 
Versuch über die Kenntnis vom Menschen (1784/85) sums up this development. Wezel’s work is 
identified for two reasons: firstly, it presents an ‘anthropologische Matrix’ of internal and external 
influences and phenomenal effects;41 secondly, Wezel’s methodology largely eschews ‘jegliche 
definitorische Bestimmungen’, ‘ideologische Vorannahmen [..] oder metaphysische Gewißheiten’, 
and keeps ‘die Zahl relevanter Vorannahmen bewußt niedrig’. In place of these modes of analysis 
the author is seen to limit himself to the ‘von Wezel einzig anerkannten “Gesetz der allgemeinen 
Verknüpfung”’ (Wissen vom Menschen, p. 37), the formulation of which I take to be consciously 
loose.42 
 
A key figure in exploring the philosophical implications of anthropology, and in particular the 
antipathy to separation that is my central theme here, is Johann Gottfried Herder. Herder doesn’t 
write a book on anthropology, and his first reference to anthropology is oblique to say the least: in 
the Anlage to an early essay called ‘Wie die Philosophie zum Besten des Volks allgemeiner und 
 
39 Arnold Gehlen, Der Mensch: Seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt. Gesamtausgabe, 10 
vols planned (Frankfurt/Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978-), III,1 (1993), p. 389. 
40 Hans-Jürgen Schings, ‘Der anthropologische Roman. Seine Entstehung und Krise im Zeitalter 
der Spätaufklärung’, in Deutschlands kulturelle Entfaltung 1763-1790: Die Neubestimmung des 
Menschen: Wandlungen des anthropologischen Konzepts im 18. Jahrhundert, ed. by Bernhard 
Fabian, Wilhelm Schmidt-Biggemann and Rudolf Vierhaus (Munich: Kraus-Thomson 
International, 1980), pp. 247–75 (p. 253). 
41 Jutta Heinz, Wissen vom Menschen und Erzäheln vom Einzelfall: Untersuchungen zum 
anthropologischen Roman der Spätaufklärung (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1996), pp. 37–38. 
42 Heinz, p. 37. The quotation is from Johann Karl Wezel, Versuch über die Kenntnis des 
Menschen, 2 vols (Leipzig: in der Dykischen Buchhandlung, 1784/5. Facsimile reprint 
Frankfurt/Main: Athenäum, 1971), I, 129. 
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nützlicher werden kann’ (1765), Herder speculatively proposes that philosophy be ‘auf 
Anthropologie zurückgezogen’,43 conceptualising anthropology as a philosophy with more modest 
scope and aims. This might explain Wolfhart Pannenberg’s reference to Herder as ‘the point of 
departure for modern philosophical anthropology’.44 The fragmentary proposal comes in the 
context of an essay in which Herder takes issue with the orientation of philosophy around 
abstracted logic and rational, speculative analysis, allegedly divorced from need or volition and in 
his view unnecessarily and erroneously separated from psychology and instrumental knowledge. 
Again, here, antipathy to conceptual separation seems to be the watchword. In ‘Vom Erkennen 
und Empfinden’, Herder protests against philosophy that separates out aspects of experience 
with artificial classifications: 
 
Wer mir sagt, was Kraft in der Seele sei und wie sie in ihr würke; dem will ich gleich 
erklären, wie sie außer sich, auch auf andre Seelen, auch auf Körper würke, die vielleicht 
nicht in der Natur durch solche Bretterwände von der Seele geschieden sind, als sie die 
Kammern unsrer Metaphysik scheiden. Überhaupt in der Natur ist nichts geschieden, 
alles fließt durch unmerkliche Übergänge auf- und ineinander; und gewiß, was Leben in 
der Schöpfung ist, ist in allen Gestalten, Formen und Kanälen nur Ein Geist, eine 
Flamme. (‘Vom Erkennen und Empfinden’, p. 178.) 
 
As the final clause indicates, of all the thinkers associated with anthropology, Herder takes the 
most decisive step away from Cartesian dualism and towards monism. One can discuss the 
strengths and weaknesses of monism and dualism as ontological positions, as Hugh Nisbet 
usefully does,45 but in my analysis the primary motivation for Herder’s antipathy to dualism and 
for his use of the vitalist concept of Kraft is his concern to avoid hard-and-fast conceptual 
distinctions and categorical separations of different aspects of experience: reason and logic from 
need and volition, and so on. 
 
This issue of conceptual and categorical separation brings us back to Schleiermacher and his 
criticism of Kant, whose apriorism is another instance of philosophy that operates by such a 
method. Schleiermacher takes the view that the sine qua non of anthropology is the conjoining of 
the free and the determined elements of our nature: ‘Anthropologie soll eben die Vereinigung 
beider seyn, und kann nicht anders als durch sie existieren’ (‘Anthropologie’, p. 302). He thinks 
Kant’s approach to anthropology is typical of his usual method, which proceeds by the 
‘Abteilungen der Wissenschaft’ (p. 301), and thereby robs the self [Ich] of ‘aller Darstellung und 
alles Zusammenhanges’ (pp. 302-03). In this way Schleiermacher’s critique of Kant’s ‘Denkart’, 
with its conceptual distinctions and categorical separations, touches on core philosophical tenets 
to do with knowledge and selfhood. 
 
Anthropology’s antipathy to separation means that its naturalist aspect cannot be understood 
exclusively in terms of this ‘Leibaffinität’, as Riedel and others suggest. Such an emphasis on the 
body arguably invokes the dualism that key strands of anthropological thinking take issue with. In 
this vein, I also want to suggest that what Schings calls the ‘Sieg der Natur und der natürlichen 
Erklärung’ over metaphysics may be identified precisely as the interweaving of psychological and 
physical, internal and external factors, combined with the avoidance of excessive ideological or 
metaphysical explanation. We have registered Blanckenburg’s call for the simultaneous 
presentation of mind, body, and environment. Implicit in this call is Blanckenburg’s view of the 
inseparability of inner and outer aspects of our experience, both in terms of mind and body, and 
internal self and external environment. He thinks that a novel is not just about external adventure, 
for external action and external causes can never be the driving force for action (see Versuch, p. 
 
43 Johann Gottfried Herder, ‘Wie die Philosophie zum Besten des Volks allgemeiner und 
nützlicher werden kann’, in Herders Sämmtliche Werke, XXX/2 (1899), 31–61 (p. 37). 
44 Wolfhart Pannenberg, Anthropology in Theological Perspective, trans. by Matthew J O’Connell 
(Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1985), p. 43. 
45 See H. B. Nisbet, Herder and Scientific Thought, MHRA Dissertation Series, 3 (Leeds: Maney, 
1970). 
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260). Rather the novel must present an ‘anschauende Verbindung des Innern und Aeußern’, 
which makes the novel into a ‘vollkommene[s] dichterische[s] Ganze’ (p. 301, p. 10). He sees the 
novel as being held together by the ‘innere Geschichte eines Charakters’, and as distinguished 
from drama by its unique focus on the ‘Veränderung des Inneren Zustandes seiner Personen’ (p. 
390, p. 391). But if a novel tells just the inner story, then the reader will feel that they are only 
getting half the story (see p. 396), and in any case Blanckenburg views inner thoughts and outer 
experience as barely separable: ‘So verhält es sich im wirklichen Leben. Das Innre und Aeußere 
des Menschen hängt so genau zusammen, daß wir schlechterdings jenes kennen müssen, wenn 
wir uns die Erscheinungen in diesem, und die ganzen Aeußerungen des Menschen erklären und 
begreiflich machen wollen’ (p. 263). (It is notable that, often, when Blanckenburg refers to inner or 
outer aspects of a character he writes in bold [see pp. 260, 388, 395, 401].) The common ground 
between Blanckenburg’s concerns here and those of anthropologists like Pölitz and Wezel 
underlies Jutta Heinz’s characterization of his ideas on the novel as a ‘Fortführung der 
Anthropologie mit anderen Mitteln’ (Wissen vom Menschen, p. 137). Moreover, in my view this 
kind of presentation of the external world of body, events and actions interwoven with the internal 
world of thoughts, attitudes, and desires doesn’t so much suggest a departure from theory, but 
arguably something more proto-phenomenological. Heinz calls Wezel’s descriptive approach in 
‘Versuch über die Kenntnis vom Menschen’ phenomenological (Wissen vom Menschen, p. 69). 
Mareta Linden uses the same term in assessing Carl Pölitz’s ‘sceptische Anthropologie’ 
(Untersuchungen zum Anthropologiebegriff, p. 115), a view supported by his stated desire to 
tread a middle path between an ‘Aggregat physiologischer Untersuchungen’ and a ‘Darstellung 
von Verhältnissen’ based on Kant’s ‘dogmatische (kantische) Kritik’ (Pölitz, Populäre 
Anthropologie, pp. 9-10). 
 
And what of aesthetics? When we left it, we were faced with a choice between Baumgarten’s 
sensory dimension of experience and Kant’s super-sensory spontaneity. As a final reflection, I 
want to argue that the antipathy to separation that I have highlighted as a thread in 
anthropological thinking has a counterpart in aesthetics, specifically in the philosophical thinking 
about grounds which goes by the name of ‘expressivism’. Expressivism articulates the idea that 
the medium of expression is more than a transparent conduit for pre-existing content, but rather 
shapes and limits, as well as by the same token expanding the possibilities of what may be 
expressed. As Andrew Bowie puts it, art ‘becomes the kind of language in which idea, word and 
thing are inseparably bound up with each other, rather than arbitrarily attached’.46 Charles Taylor 
characterises expressivism in similar terms, whereby language is seen to constitute 
consciousness by its modes of expression:47 it is ‘an articulation which both manifests and 
defines’ (The Sources of the Self, p. 375). So what is specifically ‘aesthetic’ about expressivism, 
and does this have common ground with my reflections on anthropology? To take the first 
question first, it might be enough to say that the expressivist conception of how meaning works is 
creative, in the sense that our means of expressing things about the world, language, also to 
some extent constitutes how we understand that world. That is to say, one variant of 
expressivism, expounded most extensively by Charles Taylor in Human Agency and Language, 
refers to the idea that any knowledge of the world is not simply a ‘representation’ of a reality that 
pre-exists our perception and understanding of it, but also involves constituting the world and the 
meanings associated with it (see p. 229). Metaphors and figures of speech offer obvious 
examples of this constitution of meaning: knowledge and ignorance are described in terms of light 
and dark; conceptual sophistication is expressed among other things in terms of depth. These 
figures of speech do not simply reflect, but also constitute the way we understand reality and 
think about meaning. It seems to be this world-constituting function of language that Taylor is 
getting at when refers to the expressive view of meaning as ‘retain[ing] more of the mystery 
surrounding language’ (p. 221). 
 
 
46 Bowie, p. 129. 
47 See Charles Taylor, Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers, 2 vols (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1985), I, 229.  
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Another dimension of this expressive conceptualisation of reality concerns identity and selfhood. 
Taylor points out that expressive theories ‘refer us to subjects for whom […] things can be 
manifest’ (Human Agency and Language, p. 221), such that an ‘expressive view of human life’ is 
one that involves a working out of identity on the part of the individual, rather than being a matter 
of relating (or conforming) to pre-existing models, or an objectively given world (Sources of the 
Self, p. 374). Various theoretical contributions in the late eighteenth century contribute to this 
reorientation of our sense of reality. Aesthetic theory, for instance, marks an important episode in 
which the focus shifts from the qualities of the object to the qualities of the subjective experience 
(see Sources of the Self, p. 373). Kant draws transcendental conclusions from this phenomenon, 
but it may also be traced back to the emphasis on the concrete, individual subject referred to 
above. This is brought to a point in the German tradition of Bildung, in which individual self-
realisation and the unfolding of our capacities is as important as economic success or political 
emancipation. This suggests that there is a significant ontological dimension to the 
‘Ausbreitungen’ of personal identity that we have seen Pfotenhauer refer to, as well as Riedel’s 
focus on individual development in the anthropological novel. 
 
But what is specifically ‘anthropological’ about this constellation of ideas associated with 
expressivism? Certainly, expressivist theory has been associated with anthropology, as it has 
been with aesthetic theory: Andreas Käuser describes the ‘anthropological’ approach to 
knowledge as one that acknowledges a semiotics of ‘expression’ (Ausdruck) (‘Anthropologie und 
Ästhetik’, p. 205), though he does relatively little to explain what this might mean. He does refer to 
non-linguistic, corporeal communication, but again this is too beholden to a narrow understanding 
of anthropology as naturalism. My thesis here is that understanding anthropology in terms of 
antipathy to separation allows us to grasp the anthropological element of expressivist theories. I 
want to argue that the connection with anthropology’s antipathy to separation inheres in the 
sense in which expressivism refutes the hard-and-fast separation between external reality, as 
something that is given, and the internal mental contents that re-present it or the inner identity 
that makes sense of it. The notion that these are separable is the standard position of objectivist 
or representationalist epistemologies, for whom true knowledge is what Taylor in an essay called 
‘Overcoming Epistemology’ calls ‘a correct representation of an independent reality’.48 Of course 
refuting such a view is commonplace since Kant’s phenomenological turn, but the point is that 
Kant’s ‘Denkart’, at least as it is characterised by Schleiermacher, i.e. his desire to separate 
human freedom from the determinate nature that surrounds it, is in danger of contradicting his 
own phenomenological insight. Likewise, even if Kant’s aesthetics is concerned to present 
aspects of experience and self-understanding that cannot be reduced to objective or conceptual 
terms, his focus on disinterestedness, in which human freedom is seen to be manifested in 
universal judgments of aesthetic value, and the ‘aesthetic idea’, seem to resort to a kind of arch-
concept, divorced from any interest, context, or set of culturally located values. I hope to have 
shown that the anthropological tradition is guided by an attitude that is more reticent about such 
abstractions. It is informed by an antipathy to separation which is not just concerned to account 
for the mutual interaction of internal and external aspects of experience, but also has important 
philosophical implications, which the overlap with the novel-form brings out: experience, meaning 
and identity are at some level always concrete, located, individual, a process of self-articulation – 
at the same time as they partake of an environment of language and values that render them 
more than acts of simple voluntarism or in some way self-transparent. 
 
48 Charles Taylor, ‘Overcoming Epistemology’ in After Philosophy: End or Transformation?, ed. by 
Kenneth Baynes, James Bohman and Thomas McCarthy (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), pp. 
464–88 (p. 466). 
